Abstract-Recently, key extraction from multipath wireless channels has been largely investigated. This paper tackles practical issues affecting the reliability of key agreement. We first analyze the effect of delay between the channel estimates on the probability of disagreement, and we propose a robust key extraction mechanism against delay. Later, we study the effect of mobility and improve our key generation mechanism taking into account the decorrelation of the channel. Finally, we investigate the impact of mobility on the overall secret bit generation rate.
I. INTRODUCTION
Traditional security protocols rely mainly on cryptography and hashing functions, and other mathematical properties to fulfill their goals [1] . Yet, nowadays with the widespread of wireless communication with its various applications, these protocols fail in being the adequate and perfect solution; particularly in Ad hoc and sensor networks.
In fact, the distribution of secret keys between communicating nodes is a main requirement of communication security. Some traditional solutions consider Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) mechanisms for key exchange [1] (e.g. Diffie Hellman) in the presence of a Certification Authority (CA). However, PKI mechanisms are only computationally secure and require high computational complexity. Moreover, they are unpractical in some scenarios due to the need of a CA, mainly in Ad hoc and sensor networks.
Other solutions have considered key predistribution schemes (see for example [2] ). Yet neither these appear to be appropriate and scalable solutions especially in case of large-scale sensor deployments or mobility. As a result, there have been recently a lot of efforts to find other ways to secure wireless communication.
Nowadays, a lot of attention is being given to the physical layer in wireless communication. Interestingly, it has been found that the multipath phenomenon gives wireless channels a sort of randomness and diversity that can be leveraged in extracting secret keys [3, 4, 5, 6, 7] . Actually, many real world measurements have shown that, in Time Division Duplex (TDD) wireless communications, the multipath channel between any two communicating nodes forms a reciprocal common source of randomness; such that other nodes separated by distances greater than the order of a wavelength observe a different channel. This is mainly due to the fact that in rich scattering environments, channel gains and phases vary rapidly in space. In other words, this means that an eavesdropper located few wavelengths from both communicating nodes (call them Alice and Bob) will observe uncorrelated channel coefficients. Thus, Alice and Bob can leverage their common secret reciprocal channel gains to extract a suitable secret key for their secure communication.
In this paper, we investigate physical-layer key generation from the multipath wireless channel and we tackle some practical issues affecting the reliability of key agreement. We first analyze the effect of delay between the channel estimates at the two nodes and then propose a robust mechanism to resolve this problem. Further, the effect of mobility is investigated from two points of view. First, we analyze the effect of mobility on the performance of the key generation method on a scale of one channel observation. Then, we study the relationship between mobility and the extraction of secret bits, and investigate the overall key generation rate as a function of the Doppler spread. Consequently, we propose a robust key generation mechanism against delay between the channel estimates and against mobility.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section II, we review some of the related work. Section III presents the general system model, the channel estimation process and the key agreement protocol. Moreover, we overview the Phase Shifting (PS) mechanism [3] . Section IV summarizes our simulation parameters. In section V, we discuss the effect of delay between the channel estimates and we propose a robust method against channel variation. Then, in section VI, we analyze the impact of mobility and improve the key extraction mechanism accordingly. Moreover, we investigate the effect of mobility on the overall performance. Finally, we conclude the paper in Section VII.
II. RELATED WORK
Many efforts target extracting keys using of-the-shelf devices [4, 5, 9] . These are mainly based on quantizing RSSI (Received Signal Strength Indicator) measurements then using some error reconciliation mechanisms [10] and finally privacy amplification [11] . In [4] , authors use a level crossing quantization algorithm and a heuristic log likelihood ratio estimate to improve the secret key generation rate up to 10 bits/sec. In [5] , the authors extract bits based on an adaptive quantization approach achieving key rates of 22 bits/sec at a bit disagreement rate of 2.2 percent. They further propose a more robust and enhanced bit extraction method in [8] achieving a rate of 40 bits/sec. These approaches emphasize the possibility to generate secret bits from the wireless channel. However, they are still far from what can be achieved due to the considered-hardware limitations.
Therefore, other efforts have investigated theoretical bit extraction mechanisms based on the whole channel response. For instance, the authors in [6] considered leveraging multipath by quantizing the different channel taps at the same time and then applying LDPC (Low Density Parity Check) error correcting codes. They applied their approach on ITU channels and showed some interesting results. In [7] , the authors presented an interesting approach to mitigate error through intelligent quantization methods using guard intervals and random pre-encryption. Further, in our previous work [3] , we have proposed intelligent key extraction mechanisms based on quantizing different channel taps and using optimal quantization parameters. Through simulations, we have shown that more than 120 secret bits can be generated from a single channel observation.
Yet, these theoretical attempts are mainly based on unpractical assumptions especially concerning timing of channel estimation and channel reciprocity. To the best of our knowledge, there have been no work done analyzing the effect of delay, channel decorrelation and mobility on the performance. In this section, we describe the general system model which is formed mainly of two communicating nodes Alice(Node 1) and Bob(Node 2) and an eavesdropper (Eve) as shown in Fig. 1 . We assume that Alice and Bob are using the same frequency band and that Eve is sufficiently separated so that its channel observations are completely uncorrelated from those of Bob and Alice. Moreover, due to the reciprocity principle, the two channels h 1 and h 2 are equivalent so that they can be leveraged in extracting a secret key.
III. SYSTEM MODEL

A. General System Model
B. Time-varying multipath channel
As for the channel, we suppose that it is a multipath fading channel which can be modeled as a combination of different channel taps having different amplitudes and delays. In addition, due to the mobility of the communicating nodes and/or that of the reflecting clusters, the channel is varying with time. In other words, the channel impulse response at any time instant t can be expressed as
where δ is the unit impulse function, L is the length of the channel (number of taps), while h l (t) and τ l represent the complex gain and delay of the (l + 1) th channel tap at time instant t.
In this case, the channel taps can be considered independent from each other. Hence, they can be quantized separately leveraging multipath to increase the number of secret bits generated [3, 6, 7] . However, the amplitudes of the channel taps tend to decrease exponentially with delay (first arriving signals have normally higher amplitudes).Therefore, we do not consider quantizing amplitudes as a secure approach. Yet, channel taps have been shown to have random phases uniformly distributed over [0, 2π] which encourages the idea of phase quantization to generate secret keys.
It is important to note that the variation of the channel with time can have an important influence on the performance of a key extraction method. In fact, channel variation influences negatively the channel estimation procedure. However, it has been found that the channel variation can be modeled through mathematical functions. Indeed, Basis Expansion Modeling (BEM) [12] has been largely investigated to model channel variation during short periods where the channel is highly correlated. Yet, it is necessary to find the time-spaced autocorrelation function as it determines the channel correlation as a function of time-shift ∆t. For example, if a channel estimate is acquired at time t, the autocorrelation function determines the correlation between this estimate, and the channel at some time instant t + ∆t in the future. The normalized autocorrelation function of a Rayleigh fading channel with motion at a constant velocity is expressed as a zeroth-order Bessel function of the first kind [13] :
where f D is in this case the maximum Doppler spread due to mobility and can be expressed as :
. v is here the speed of the mobile node and c the speed of light; while f is the transmission frequency.
C. Channel Estimation
Considering an OFDM (Orthogonal Frequency Division Multiplexing) system, the estimated channel coefficients in the frequency domain can be obtained by a simple division as [12] 
where n G is the added white Gaussian noise vector which can be different at the two nodes; and H is a vector of N channel coefficients in the frequency domain with N being the FFT (Fast Fourier Transform) size. These channel coefficients can be expressed (taking out the time index t) as
A direct approach that comes first in mind is quantizing these coefficients directly. But since they are correlated, we tend to transform them to the time domain where we get the uncorrelated channel taps. Hence, in our approach, we first estimate the H k 's and then by Fourier transform we obtain the h l 's:
where z is here the equivalent Gaussian noise in the time domain.
We note here also that the use of N channel coefficients in the frequency domain to find the time domain channel taps leads to a power gain of the Tap-to-Noise Ratio (TNR) = N .
D. Key Agreement Protocol
In the last section, we have seen that communicating nodes need only to estimate their common reciprocal channel to be able to generate a secret key. It is also very important to perform this channel estimation in a very short period, especially in case of mobility where the channel response varies rapidly. Here, we adopt the simple agreement protocol proposed in [3] where we define, without loss of generality, that Node 1 is the leading node and Node 2 is the follower. In this case, Node 1 needs first to transmit a pilot/reference OFDM symbol helping Node 2 to get an accurate estimate of the channel. Then, Node 2 directly transmits another pilot OFDM symbol back. Hence, both can estimate the channel taps (getting some noisy estimates) and proceed in the quantization and key generation procedure applying the phase shifting mechanism.
E. Phase Shifting Mechanism
The direct approach consists of directly quantizing the phases of the obtained channel taps without any further considerations. In other words, it consists of demodulating the random phases of the channel taps based on a fixed modulation constellation. However, this leads to a high probability of error since channel taps lying close to the border of the decision regions are very prone to error. Therefore, we proposed an intelligent key generation mechanism that aims at shifting the phase of each channel tap synchronously approaching the demodulation constellation. The idea is mainly to convert the problem into a normal demodulation problem where the channel phase values are spread around the constellation points. Then, a direct quantization can be applied on the phase-shifted channel taps which are now constellation points affected by noise and are not randomly distributed anymore.
To clarify this procedure, lets consider h 1 as the channel estimate at Node 1 and h 2 as the channel estimate at Node 2. By taking only one tap, equation (5), can be written as
where in this case h 1 is considered normalized, and z 1 , z 2 are then the independent added white Gaussian noises at both nodes which are supposed to be of equal power
We suppose here that a reliable channel exists for the transmission of µ to Node 2. Consequently, Node 2 corrects its own estimated channel tap phase as:
where θ 2 is the phase of the corresponding channel tap h 2 as seen by Node 2. Or we can write (7) as:
From a security point of view, one may think how secure is this approach and if it risks any loss of secrecy. In fact, as the phases of channel taps are random and uniformly distributed, then the transmission of a phase shift over the public channel does not reveal any information about the corresponding phase. This can only be understood by an eavesdropper that the phase of the channel tap is µ away from a constellation point. But as the constellation points are equiprobable, this provides no additional information to the eavesdropper. Moreover, the leader node is supposed to declare to the other nodes the indexes of the channel taps to be considered, i.e. those with sufficient TNR. Eventually, neither this does leak any information to an eavesdropper.
As for the performance, we derive the probability of disagreement for quantizing one channel tap as a function of the tap-to-noise ratio TNR and the number of quantization levels M . In fact, an error only occurs in the key extraction process if |∆θ| is large enough, i.e. if |∆θ| > π/M . Then the probability of disagreement per one channel tap at high TNR can be approximated [3] as:
Based on this equation, we develop an adaptive quantization algorithm where the number of quantization levels varies depending on the tap-to-noise ratio. In fact, we target achieving a certain probability of error per channel tap and seek the maximum number of quantization levels. Thus by considering a probability of error per channel tap less than 10 −3 , we obtain the optimal number of quantization levels as a function of TNR as shown in Fig. 2 .
In Fig. 3 , we plot the average, max and min number of extracted secret bits (from one channel observation) as a function of SNR (received Signal-to-Noise Ratio.) for a probability of disagreement between extracted bits in the order of 10 −3 . We can see clearly here how the PS mechanism behaves adaptively according to the received SNR.
However, in the above results, simultaneous channel estimation without any delay between the observed channel estimates was considered. Obviously, this is not a real assumption considering practical implementations. Delay between the channel estimates can be due to transmission delay, transmit-to-receiveswitch delay in addition to other protocol related factors. Therefore, it is important to study the effect of delay between channel estimates in mobile scenarios on the performance. Consequently, a good key extraction mechanism should be robust to such inevitable timing issues.
IV. SIMULATION PARAMETERS
Our system follows, without loss of generality, the 802.11n standard [14] . In particular, we consider the 20 MHz bandwidth divided over 64 subcarriers and we consider TDD communication. The duration of each OFDM symbol is 3.2µs in addition to a cyclic prefix up to 1.6µs. As for the channel model, we test our algorithms on one of the defined channel models by IEEE 802.11 Task Group n (TGn) [15] ; particularly, we use the Model F which is defined as a large space indoor or outdoor channel model. We vary the delay between the channel estimates from a range of 5µs (smallest delay) to 250µs. Finally, we modify the channel model F to include higher mobility, and we consider Doppler spreads ranging from 5 to 300 Hz.
We consider in our simulations a SISO (Single Input Single Output) channel. And we express the results of our algorithms in terms of probability of disagreement and average number of secret bits generated as a function of delay and/or mobility for an SNR of 30dB. Our results are based on performing extensive Monte Carlo simulations.
V. MITIGATING DELAY EFFECT
In this section, we first study the effect of delay between the channel estimates at the two nodes. Then, based on the results we propose an enhancement to the key extraction mechanism to mitigate the performance degradation due to delay.
A. Impact of Delay on Performance
As we have discussed before, we adopt the PS key generation mechanism proposed in [3] and we study the variation of the probability of disagreement as a function of the delay between the two channel estimates. We remind here that, in [3] , we targeted a certain performance threshold and derived the optimal quantization level in function of the tap-to-noise ratio without any consideration of the time variation of the channel. Fig.4 shows the probability of disagreement as a function of the delay between both channel estimates for an SNR of 30dB. Observing the solid line, we can see clearly that as the delay between the channel estimates increases, the probability of disagreement also increases significantly. This is mainly due to the varying nature of the channel. However, for such considered delays the channel should be still highly correlated. In fact, the coherence time (for an autocorrelation > 0.75), normally approximated as: τ C = 1 2πfD , is here in the order of few milliseconds while the delay is in the order of microseconds. This means that it is possible to correct the channel gain and mitigate the phase variation. In the following section, we propose a modification to the secret bit extraction mechanism mitigating the effect of the variation of the channel gains during the coherence period.
B. 3-Way Mechanism
As discussed above, during the considered delays the channel is highly correlated. Hence, it is possible to correct the phases of the channel taps and remove the effect of channel variation.
To accomplish this task, we model the variation of the channel according to a BEM as discussed in Section II.B. Particularly, we model the channel variation as a polynomial of the first order, i.e. a linear modeling, since the normalized Doppler spread is relatively small [12] . In this case, it is necessary to have two estimates to obtain the modeling coefficients. Thus, we modify our agreement protocol to be a 3-way channel estimation mechanism. In details, Node 1 transmits a pilot symbol, then Node 2 transmits back also a pilot symbol and finally Node 1 retransmits another. In this case, Node 2 would obtain two channel estimates at instants t 1 and t 3 that can be used to obtain the modeling coefficients. As a result, Node 2 can now use the modeling function to calculate an estimate of the channel gains at the same instant t 2 when Node 1 would have obtained a channel estimate; i.e. applying a linear modeling, Node 2 can calculate an estimate of h(t 2 ) using the following equation:
We test this algorithm on the same system as before and with the different delay values. The dotted line in Fig.4 shows the probability of disagreement as a function of delay for the 3-way mechanism. We can see obviously in this case, that the 3-way mechanism is more robust to delay between the channel estimates. We obtain a probability of disagreement in the order of 10 −3 as intended in our algorithm optimization [3] while achieving an average number of 67 secret bits generated from a single channel observation.
VI. MOBILITY
In the discussion above, we have only considered the case of low mobility to study the effect of delay between the channel estimates. However, the variation of the channel leading to the degradation of performance in case of delay is mainly due to the mobility of the communicating nodes and/or reflecting clusters. Therefore, it is essential to study the effect of mobility on the performance of the key extraction mechanism. As argued before, the channel variation can be partially corrected by the 3-way mechanism presented above. However, higher mobility leads on one hand to a faster decorrelation of the channel such that the channel estimates obtained at the two nodes are affected by a partial decorrelation in addition to the phase variation. And on the other hand, it leads to a bigger error in the polynomial modeling procedure. Fig. 5 shows the probability of disagreement as a function of Doppler spread for an SNR of 30dB and a delay between the channel estimates of 250µs. The solid line corresponds to the 3-way mechanism introduced in the last section. We can observe clearly that higher mobility leads to a significant increase in the probability of disagreement.
A. Enhanced 3-Way Mechanism
In this section, we propose a mobility-resilience enhancement to the 3-way mechanism to mitigate the effect of channel decorrelation and modeling error due to mobility. The idea is to approximate the channel decorrelation and deviation from the linear model as an added noise. However, it is difficult to calculate the exact value of this noise. Therefore, we approximate it as an added Gaussian noise of variance in function of the normalized Doppler spread ν D :
The dotted line in Fig.5 shows the probability of disagreement by using the mobility-resilient Enhanced 3-way mechanism. We observe that this mechanism mitigates the error due to mobility and achieves the aimed probability of disagreement (in the order of 10 −3 ). However, the added noise due to higher mobility leads to a lower number of secret bits generated, as a result of the adaptive property of the key generation mechanism in function of received SNR. In Fig.6(a) , we plot the average number of secret bits generated as a function of the Doppler spread using the Enhanced 3-way mechanism. We can observe that mobility has a negative effect on the number of secret bits generated from a single channel observation, as it decreases from 67 secret bits for a Doppler frequency of 5 Hz to 45 secret bits for a Doppler frequency of 300 Hz. This is mainly due to the decorrelation of the channel which leads to more noisy estimates.
B. Effect of Mobility on Overall Performance
As we have seen above, mobility and consequently Doppler spread have a negative effect on the performance of the key extraction mechanism corresponding to a single channel observation. However, the effect of mobility on the overall key generation rate (measured in sbits(secret bits)/sec) is not clear yet. Therefore, one may ask: Is mobility an advantage or a disadvantage for the key generation procedure?
To answer this question, we have to find the overall performance as a function of the Doppler spread. We should note here that higher mobility means faster decorrelation of the channel. On one hand, this signifies a lower average number of bits generated from a single channel observation due to the decorrelation problem discussed above. On the other hand, this means a faster observation of an uncorrelated channel, i.e. faster re-use of the channel to extract secret bits. Actually, it has been found that the channel decorrelates completely after an interval approximately greater than: 2 fD . Therefore, after this interval it is possible to get new uncorrelated channel estimates and apply the key generation mechanism to obtain a new set of secret bits.
In Fig.6 (b) , the secret bits generation rate in sbits/sec as a function of the Doppler spread is plotted. We observe that the secret bits generation rate increases as a function of mobility. In particular, it increases from 167.5 sbits/sec to 6793 sbits/sec for an increase of the Doppler spread from 5 to 300 Hz. We can deduce from this graph that mobility is an advantage to the key generation procedure and permits a higher secret bits generation rate.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we investigated the effects of delay between channel estimates and mobility on the performance of the key generation procedure based on leveraging the reciprocal multipath wireless channel. First, we proposed a 3-way extraction procedure to mitigate the effect of channel variation. It is mainly based on modeling the channel variation by a linear function during a certain time window (time delay between the channel estimates). We further investigated the effect of mobility and improved the key generation mechanism to avoid the decorrelation of the channel due to mobility and maintain the target probability of disagreement. However, this resulted in a lower average number of bits generated from a single channel observation as function of the Doppler spread. Finally, we demonstrated through simulations that mobility is in fact an advantage due to the faster decorrelation of the channel permitting a faster re-keying. The results obtained showed that the overall secret bit generation rate increases as a function of mobility despite the lower average number of secret bits generated per a single channel realization.
Yet, it is still unclear to which extent mobility stays an advantage and what is the optimal mobile scenario for the key generation process. An answer to this question will be the subject of future investigations.
